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Abstract 
Organizations experiment with how smart 
technology can be used to manage employees since 
before COVID-19 and the possibilities seem almost 
limitless. However, the question of how this can be 
achieved without impairing the so-needed trust inside 
organizations is yet to answer. Hence, in this study, we 
employ a crisp-set QCA to investigate what trust-
enabling datafication control configurations look like. 
Drawing on unique survey data from Switzerland, we 
show that datafication control can go hand in hand with 
trust if organizations make efforts for employee-
centricity. Further, we can reveal four distinct ways of 
how organizations can implement employee-centricity 
to mitigate possible trust-impairing signals that stem 
from augmented data-gathering and analysis 
capabilities. Our results contribute to the still heated 
debate on the duality of control and trust. They also help 
leaders to navigate through the unmanageable 




A recent Mc Kinsey Global Executive study has 
shown that the COVID-19 crisis has strongly 
accelerated the digitization of companies’ internal 
processes by a rough estimate of four years [1]. We 
assume that concurrently the so-called “datafication” of 
employees, i.e. the process of translating their 
idiosyncrasy and social relations at work into 
quantifiable data has been equally on the rise [2]. This 
has become evident in newspaper reports about 
organizations deliberately experimenting with time 
tracking software or team-based workforce analytics to 
control employees [3, 4]. Such software and the 
accompanying smart technology are used to monitor 
employee performance and communication patterns, to 
derive new insights on individual performance, or to 
analyze, for instance, how teamwork can be better 
structured. Possibly these insights are also used for 
prescriptive analytics making the “automation of 
leadership” possible, where datafication nudges or tells 
employees how to behave more efficiently and 
appropriately, without human involvement [5]. 
Meanwhile, COVID-19 has heavily strained 
interpersonal relations in organizations, and the advent 
of datafication is feared to diminish the quality of 
relationships in companies even further [6, 7]. Hence the 
ability to sustain or even build trust inside the 
organization, and therewith between employees, leaders 
and their employer is paramount [8, 9] and likely a 
prerequisite for effective datafication control enactment.  
Yet how trust and datafication control relate, and 
especially how such technologically augmented ways to 
monitor, support, and direct employees are related to 
trust inside the organization is still a matter of a heated 
debate [10, 11]. Therefore, in this study, we investigate 
how datafication, as means to enact organizational 
control, relates to trust inside the organization. We 
understand datafication control as a smart technology-
supported process, by which the attention of employees 
and their motivation to act is directed towards the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives [12]. More 
specifically, we explore controls that are supported by 
smart technology and thereby enable “an entity to 
function appropriately and with foresight in its 
environment” [13]. Employees thus face datafication 
control where they become more and more visible and 
subject to automated (HR) decision-making. Schafheitle 
and colleagues [14] have shown how datafication 
expands traditional organizational control considerably 
as their morphological analysis has revealed more than 
230’000 possible datafication control configurations. 
This adds to the complexity for organizations on how to 
orchestrate an effective deployment of datafication 
control configurations and enables a variety of routes 
how they can impact trust positively or negatively. 
However, most research on the interplay of 
datafication control and trust has been directed towards 
the question of how datafication relates to trust in 
technology [i.e., see 15]. Yet relatively little is known 
on how trust inside the organization is impacted through 
the use of smart technology; let alone through 








datafication controls. For example, research on 
electronic performance monitoring [16] primarily 
examines its impact on employee strain, privacy, or 
justice perceptions and, if anything, its impact on trust 
in direct supervisors [17]. In this paper, however, we 
define trust inside the organization as a proxy for “trust 
as the enacted principle” across all organizational 
relationships”, hence with no fixed trustor-trustee-
direction. Rather, we are interested in how strong 
trusting beliefs are shared across different roles or 
levels, how one’s willingness to be vulnerable 
determines his/her way of interpreting and approaching 
his/her counterparts, hence the extent to which 
organizational relationships are characterized by trust 
[18]. We focus on trust inside the organization, as this 
type of trust is strongly linked to enabling employees to 
cope with situations characterized by change or 
perceived lack of control. It helps them in dealing with 
any kind of possibly anxiety-creating environments, for 
instance, those crafted through invasive technologies 
[9]. Empirically, we rely on survey data about the use of 
smart technology from a senior HR-management 
perspective, considering them as key informants on 
“what is going on” inside the organization with regards 
to smart technology deployment and trust from a bird’s 
eye view [19]. To explore datafication control 
configurations and their impact on trust inside the 
organizations, we reanalyze this Likert-scale survey 
data by calibrating it into crisp-set format, suitable to be 
analyzed via qualitative comparative analysis [csQCA, 
see 20]. Our results show various ways how datafication 
control can be enacted in a trust-enabling way. Across 
all datafication control configurations, the role of the 
organization is pivotal as it needs to take an active 
stance in designing datafication control in an employee-
centric way. Our results indicate that neither 
datafication-augmented data-gathering possibilities nor 
its prescriptive automation potential per se impair trust 
as long as employees’ view is integrated. 
 
2. Datafication control systems and trust  
 
2.1. Configurational view of datafication control  
We define organizational control as any process by 
which the organization, managers, or organizational 
members, direct the attention, motivate, and encourage 
employees to act in desired ways to achieve the 
organization’s objectives [21-23]. Controls can be either 
codified and formal or social and informal [23] and may 
be directed towards inputs, processes/behaviors, and 
outputs/performance. When combined with smart, 
hence foresighted, technology for data-gathering and 
interpretation, a new information phenomenon emerges 
that creates finer levels of granularity and scalability of 
information [24]. This has been termed datafication and 
characterizes the process of transforming artifacts of 
personality and social life into computerized data to 
generate new forms of value [2].  
Building on insights from Schafheitle and 
colleagues [14], we argue that such technologies have 
altered “analog” organizational control. Hence, we now 
refer to it as “datafication control”. Smart technology 
has already taken up on critical control functions (i.e., 
such as performance monitoring or rewarding, see [25]) 
and expands its scope to spheres that were not targeted 
in the “analog world”. For instance, datafication control 
expands traditional organizational control, by codifying 
norms and sentiments. Additionally, it also alters 
traditional organization control by enabling the 
automatic generation of the control targets – namely 
employee or even organizational objectives. In practice, 
organizational control processes have been increasingly 
augmented by such smart technologies [26]. One 
prominent example is Amazon, where algorithms 
accelerate working rates to “optimize” employee 
performance [27]. Companies like WorkSmart even 
pride themselves on measuring and enhancing 
employee’s productivity by taking screen- and webcam 
shots, tracking mouse clicks, and keystrokes [28].  
In addition, datafication control should be 
understood as a control configuration. In this view, 
control elements, for instance, monitoring direction 
(behaviors or outcomes) or evaluation technology 
(descriptive or prescriptive) are not explored separately 
but as elements of an interdependent system. More 
specifically, we explore such a system with the lens of 
what Cardinal and colleagues [12,  p. 570] have termed 
a “strong holistic approach”. This approach emphasizes 
the combinatory and complementary logic of various 
control elements within one system, i.e. how control 
elements interact and blend to be or become effective. 
Capturing datafication control as a control configuration 
lends three important vantage points. First, it is well 
suited to account for the complexity of datafication 
control which enables a myriad of new options that have 
not been captured in “analog” organizational control. 
Second, thinking in control configurations allows 
researchers to analyze combinations and 
complementarities in non-linear, asymmetric, and 
equifinal ways [23, 29]. Non-linear means that the 
influence of one control element can be dependent on 
the common interaction with other elements regarding a 
specific outcome criterion. The assumption of 
asymmetry implies that also the absence of a control 
element can be fundamental for an outcome to occur. 
Equifinality, signifies several unique control 
configurations impact an outcome in the same fashion. 
Thirdly, this interplay can then be studied with any 





which remains unexplored in to-date organizational 
behavior and HR management research [10, 32]. 
 
2.2. Datafication control systems and trust 
 
We suggest that exploring datafication control 
configurations related to the outcome of trust inside the 
organization is of particular interest. Scholars from a 
variety of disciplines agree that the impact on trust 
inside the organization seems critical for a successful 
deployment of datafication control [33]. Owing to both 
the new complexity of datafication controls and also 
because datafication technology functions as an opaque 
“black-box”, employees’ trust seems to be inevitably 
affected particularly regarding its core building blocks 
[10]: (1) vulnerability and (2) positive expectations.  
First, datafication control makes employee 
vulnerabilities towards various organizational members 
more salient; hence trust is needed to “bridge” them. 
Concerning employees’ trust in their employer, 
augmented data-gathering capabilities of datafication 
controls make panoptic states for employees more 
likely, where close, constant, and all-encompassing 
datafication highlights employees’ vulnerability 
towards the employing organization which decides on 
pay, promotion, and staying options [8]. With regards to 
trust in leaders, datafication control’s augmented data-
analysis capabilities, that bear automation potential, 
make it more difficult for employees to appeal to a 
leader’s empathy [34]. Therefore employees might feel 
their opportunities for growth and development to be at 
the mercy of a non-living and non-context-sensitive 
entity [35]. Additionally, employees’ vulnerability 
towards peers seems to be affected. Hereby, employees 
might feel more vulnerable because of datafication-
heightened transparency, which can easily turn into 
contrastive comparison, a form of competition 
involving envy and suffering [36].  
Secondly, datafication controls make it more 
difficult for employees to form positive expectations on 
their various trust counterparts’ future intent or 
behavior. Regarding their trust relationship with the 
employer, the increased internal complexity and 
combinatorics of datafication controls make 
unanticipated and undesirable side effects probable. 
These include the often-cited transparency paradox 
[37], low-trust signals, or fraud labeling and manifest, 
for instance, if employee consent is required, yet 
information of datafication controls’ functioning is 
incomprehensible [38], cannot be explained [39], or is 
obtained by a generic clause in the employment 
contract. Employees’ trust in leaders might be 
negatively affected by datafication controls “black-
box”-character, because “two-leader”-situations emerge 
[35]. The black-box character of datafication controls 
likely threatens the sovereignty of observation from 
leaders and, hence, employees might face (HR) 
decisions, where leaders lack information of what 
employee data has been gathered and why it has been 
analyzed [25, 40]. “Two-leader”-situations become 
particularly trust-problematic because they lead to 
employees finding themselves in situations, where 
human leaders’ role-prescribed responsibilities blur 
(e.g., who takes (moral) responsibility for decisions?) or 
conflicting decisions of human leaders and algorithms 
appear [e.g., trust in datafication controls becomes a 
“poisoned chalice", see 41]. With regards to trust in 
peers, the double-edged nature of technology-
augmented transparency might put positive expectations 
to the test. For instance, employees notice that their 
peers are only concerned with "flaunting performance" 
to gamble with the datafication controls, free-ride, or 
that “everything I know about you, I can use against 
you"-norms emerge. Because of this rather fuzzy 
mélange of effects on employees’ trust in various trust 
referents and their likely interactions across levels, a 
focus on trust beliefs inside the organization as enacted 
principles seems particularly warranted.   
 
3. Research design and methods  
Our paper aims to explore the causal complexities 
pertinent to the trust-enabling use of datafication 
controls inside workplaces. To this end, we conduct a 
crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) that 
allows us to explore how datafication control elements 
(labeled as causal conditions) combine effectively so 
that trust inside the organization is not impaired [42]. In 
other words, our analysis reveals what datafication 
control elements are necessary and/or what 
combinations are (jointly) sufficient for trust to remain 
as an enacted principle [43].  
Although rather novel in OB research [44], csQCA 
qualifies for answering our research question because it 
analytically treats cases (here companies) as 
manifestations of configurations of causal conditions. 
Hence, our analytical goal here is to unfold what 
configurations turn out as internally consistent across 
cases to make our outcome of interest, i.e., trust emerge 
[45, 46]. To this end, csQCA establishes cause-effect 
relationships via set-theoretic sub- and superset 
relations: Here, this means to analyze the logical 
relationships of causal conditions inherent in the cases 
with regards to trust (in practical parlance: is the 
datafication control element A necessary for trust, i.e., 
does it  not occur without A? Or, is B sufficient for trust, 
i.e., does it occur without B but, whenever B is present, 
trust also occurs?). Causal complexity is disentangled 
via Boolean AND/OR/NOT truth table analysis, 





combinations of the datafication control elements [29]. 
Hence, and different from net-effects-oriented analyses, 
QCA methodologically mirrors the basic assumptions of 
the configurational theory - that a datafication control 
system is made up of various elements that can combine 
in a non-linear, asymmetrical, and equifinal way [14, 
29]. Additionally, the method is powerful in analyzing 
complex, multi-level organizational phenomena 
because, in Charles Ragin’s [47] words, it seizes the 
benefits from both, the quantitative and the qualitative 
world. Practically, it relies on data, where our case 
companies have calibrated membership scores (i.e., 
similar to numerical variable expressions) in sets of 
causal conditions (i.e., similar to independent and 
dependent variables). Different from Likert-scale 
measurement, the process of calibration makes such 
membership scores meaningful themselves because it 
urges researchers to incorporate external standards, that 
stem from case- and context-knowledge as reference 
points. For instance, 100 degrees Celsius, as a calibrated 
measure, is directly interpretable because it refers to the 
side point of water as an external standard. Relatedly, 
the method’s case- and context-sensitivity also 
materializes in that a meaningful interpretation of the 
resulting causal recipes requires researchers to assess 
causal complexity across cases (here: what do trust-
enabling datafication control configurations look like 
and why are they distinct from each other?) and within-
cases [i.e., what distinguishes the empirical cases, that 
make up one particular configuration?, see 47, 48]. 
Hence, with this method, each case company’s 
idiosyncrasy, in terms of how datafication control is 
implemented and enacted is disentangled as 
configurational patterns and such patterns are 
generalized across relevant cases [47, 49].  
In this paper, we adopt an explorative-oriented 
crisp-set version of QCA where cases can have either 1 
(fully in) or 0 (fully out) as set membership score in each 
causal condition and the outcome. We chose this version 
because cumulative knowledge on how datafication 
control configurations can be enacted in a trust-enabling 
way is scarce. Hence we cannot develop strong 
assumptions based on the current state of knowledge 
[10, 12]. The ”discovery” nature of csQCA allows us to 
still fully seize the benefits of QCA as a means of 
disentangling causal complexity. The rather “coarse-
grained” calibration enables us to contribute rich case 
and context knowledge, via comparing and interpreting 
the resulting causal configurations within and across 
cases. Thus, it is well fitted for an explorative research 
design [50, 51]. To meet standards of “good” QCA-
practice, we adhere to the 4-step transparency procedure 
of [52] comprising: (1) identifying causal factors and 
relevant cases, (2) calibrating the data, as well as 
analyses of (3) necessity and (4) sufficiency [44]. 
3.1. Empirical data-base  
We rely on original, individualized, and cross-
sectional data from a broader, and publicly funded 
research project [53], where we could realize a net 
convenience sample of 159 senior-level company 
representatives from Switzerland as key informants 
[19]. We were interested in what smart technology-
based control applications are used, how they are 
implemented, and how our key informants, HR 
managers, perceive trust as an enacted principle in their 
companies. We ensured a maximum dispersion of 
companies in terms of business sector distribution and 
company size since business ethics and legal scholars 
pointed us to company size and degree of regulation in 
the business sector as critical variables for practically 
seizing the benefits of datafication [see 54]. Hence, 22% 
of our sample companies stem from the finance and 
insurance sector, 19% from manufacturing and 
production of goods, 12% from public administration, 
national defense, and social insurance, 10% from health 
care, 9% from information and communication 
technology and 8% from trade, retail, and repair. The 
remaining 30% comprises companies from education, 
NGO, energy, entertainment, construction, agriculture, 
and forestry. Since the use of datafication control only 
makes economic sense above a certain company size 
[e.g., 55], 94.7% of our sample companies meet the 
European Union 250 employees-threshold of a large 
company, of which 70% have more than 500 employees.  
Initially, we asked the respondents to assess the 
permeation level of their organizational control systems 
with datafication technology. To this end, we relied on 
qualitative insights of Schafheitle and colleagues [14] to 
present a comprehensive list of practical datafication 
control applications, asking them to tick all those they 
already use. From this, we built a summary index 
ranging from 1 (i.e., one tool in use) to 15 [i.e., all tools 
from the list in use, see also 56]. Moreover, we treat the 
original framework dimensions of Schafheitle and 
colleagues [14] as survey variables and the specifying 
elements as constitutive items, whenever appropriate. 
We followed Boselie and colleagues [57,  p. 74] and 
measured each framework dimension by its perceived 
intensity (i.e., “To what extent do you believe your 
employees to be exposed to […]?”). Yet, we measured 
the dimension “Openness for Employee Participation” 
in terms of its occurrence: “To what extent are 
employees able to voluntarily contribute additional 
information about themselves to HR Analytics […]”. 
Intensity perceptions of HR managers were measured 
via 5-point Likert scales, since nominal measures (i.e., 
yes/no) tend to fall short on measurement validity of HR 
instruments, such as datafication control [57]. With 





company), we included the 4-item internal trust 
measure, which has proven to be a valid assessment of 
trust “as an enacted principle” (5-point Likert scale) [18,  
p. 89]. From this, we inferred that if senior-level 
managers perceived the internal trust in their companies 
as high, then their company places great value on it, and 
vice versa [see 58].  
 
3.2. Causal conditions and relevant cases 
As outlined above, this csQCA builds on the 
empirically validated tool compromising eleven 
dimensions with two to six specifying elements (i.e., 36 
elements) to measure and map over 230’000 possible 
datafication control configurations inside organizations. 
The dimensions comprise the basic premises of 
traditional control theory (e.g., control timing, targets, 
and scope) but also datafication control-unique 
dimensions, such as the datafication control’s openness 
for employee participation or the degree to which 
employees understand the functioning of datafication 
control, amongst others. For csQCA application, we 
treat such dimensions as causal conditions hereafter. As 
csQCA is best executed with a small to an intermediate 
number of causal conditions, we reduced the original 
framework [42]; to arrive at a meaningful reduction of 
the original framework dimensions, we built on insights 
from electronic performance monitoring [e.g., 16] and 
human-machine interaction [e.g., 59]. We ensured 
maximum variability of causal conditions by focusing 
on the (a) “organizational layers”, i.e., technology-
design and implementation strategies as well as (b) 
“permeation layers” of employees’ working and living 
reality within and beyond the workplace. These two 
layers have been shown to matter if one wants to 
understand the impact of smart technologies on 
employees’ perceptions, and hence likely on trust inside 
the organization [33, 60, 61].  
The organizational layer related to the design and 
implementation of datafication control is represented 
with the dimension openness for employee participation 
as a first causal condition. Furthermore, the 
implementation strategies are captured by employees’ 
possibilities to opt-out from the use of datafication 
control as well as through the dimension transparency, 
that is employees’ knowledge on what data is gathered 
and why it is analyzed [39]. For the “permeation layer”, 
we included the dimension analytical capacity, because, 
from a trust perspective, the more “intelligent” a 
datafication control system gets, the greater its 
automation potential of HR decisions. Finally, as the last 
dimension, we wanted to capture the “visible employee” 
[62] and, hence, combined target of control (outcomes 
and behaviors) as well as its scope (on-the-job and off-
the-job) to emphasize the pervasive nature of 
datafication technologies’, which does not stop at the 
company premises’ doors [62, 63]. With regards to 
relevant cases, we analyzed the empirical company 
distribution of our summary datafication permeation 
index, having a modal value of 0, a median value of 2, 
and, for diagnostic-descriptive means, a mean value of 
2.8. However, to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of 
our emerging causal configurations across- and within-
case, the cases should a priori exhibit a prima facie 
datafication permeation of their control system [47, 64]. 
We decided to select only companies above the 50% 
quartile of our datafication permeation summary index, 
yielding n=73 cases for csQCA. At a closer inspection, 
the final number of cases comprise tend to be large 
companies (>400 employees) from more regulated 
business industries, such as finance and insurance, 
manufacturing and production of goods as well as public 
administration, social insurance, and healthcare.  
 
3.3. Calibrating the crisp-set data  
 
We calibrated our original survey data for csQCA 
in 1 (i.e., fully in) and 0 (i.e., fully out) in line with the 
recommendations of Rihoux and De Meur [20]. They 
strongly advise against simply performing an arithmetic 
median split of Likert-scale values, but to include 
contextual information as external standards to make the 
“quantification” of each case company meaningfully 
interpretable. In our case, we paid special attention to 
the Swiss legal context as well as on macro-economic 
peculiarities. For the Openness for Employee 
Participation (PART), we calibrated the degree to 
which employees can contribute additional information 
to datafication controls to make its data-gathering and 
analyses more accurate. The Swiss legal framework can 
be described as quite employer-friendly and thus leaves 
great leeway for interpretation, as to whether and how 
much to allow employees to participate. Hence, a high 
degree of employee participation is completely 
voluntary and can be seen as a strong additional effort. 
By employee opt-out (OPT), we understand the 
existence of a formal opportunity for employees to 
withdraw from being a target of datafication control. 
Under Swiss labor and obligation acts as well as under 
GDPR, where data processing relies on employee 
consent, employees may withdraw their consent at any 
time. In addition, the GDPR deals with the principle of 
purpose limitation and data minimization, i.e. only data 
that is required for the indicated purpose must be 
processed. This means that datafication may only take 
place within time and scope limits (i.e., to fulfill the 
employment contract obligations or to assess the 
suitability of the employee or candidate). Hence, 
calibration of opt-out mirrors a company’s legal norm 





understand the quality of knowledge, employees have 
concerning what data about them are gathered and why 
they are analyzed in the realm of datafication control. 
Transparency is a core feature of GDPR and legally 
manifests in the obligation to provide prior current, 
specific and understandable information to employees, 
on what the technology measures and analyzes. 
However, the norm gives a wide scope of interpretation 
for practical application. Hence, a high degree of 
transparency exceeds what is customary in a particular 
industry. We calibrate the automation potential (AUT) 
of datafication controls based on their descriptive, 
predictive and prescriptive technological capabilities 
[65]. In short, datafication control has the potential not 
only to provide "advice and assistance" to leaders 
(descriptive) but also to suggest decisions (predictive) 
or even execute them itself (prescriptive). Building on 
the “Automating Society Switzerland”[66] report, 
however, the maturity of “intelligent” datafication 
controls is rather sparsely overall, and if at all, it is used 
to re-analyze existing data a second time. With Visible 
employee (VISIB), we calibrate the degree of 
granularity, to which datafication controls permeate 
employees’ personal spaces and hence, to which extent 
companies take the risk of unintentionally invading 
employees’ privacy. In Switzerland, however, the 
integrity and self-determination of the population have 
a very high historical value and easily translate as an 
unwritten principle of “good business practice”, also 
from a legal perspective. Finally, trust inside the 
organization (TRUST) is fairly pronounced in Swiss 
workplaces and safeguarded by particular datafication-
relevant government initiatives, data ethical 
investments, and nationwide role model projects. As a 
result, we calibrated companies’ trust variation 
according to these high trust baseline [66].  
4. Results and interpretation  
Initially, we performed a superset- and XY-plot 
analysis to examine if some of our conditions are 
necessary for a trust-enabling use of datafication 
control. Technically, we analyzed if one or more of our 
causal factors are so-called supersets of the outcome, 
indicating that an enabling use of datafication control 
cannot occur without such condition(s) being present 
and/or absent. We evaluated the consistency values of 
our superset analysis which, if they exceed 0.95, 
indicate necessity [52]. As a result, none of our causal 
 
1 Note: The survey and additional data-analysis material can be 
accessed via https://cutt.ly/0EhhqA3. 
2 Note: (*) represents a logical AND, (+) represents a logical OR, and 
(~) indicates the absence of a causal condition. The table reads from 
top left to bottom right and displays four jointly sufficient trust-
enabling configurations of datafication control  We dispense with a 
conditions’ single and joint presence or absence 
exceeded this threshold (PART=0.79; ~VISIB=0.75). 
Consequently, we performed a truth table analysis 
for (joint) sufficiency1. We set the frequency threshold 
of cases to 1 and the consistency cutoff to 0.75, similar 
to what Fiss and colleagues [46] have outlined as “good 
practice” for truth table minimization. We also checked 
for the robustness of our analysis as we iterated the 
analysis with a slightly higher and lower cutoff value; 
particularly, the results of the stricter cutoff value 
support our final determination of 0.75. Besides, we 
allowed the analysis of all conditions as present or 
absent. Building on the most recent insights of Thiem 
[67,  p. 4], we present the parsimonious solution of our 
truth table minimization (Table 1), since it has proven 
most robust in terms of causal inference and with 
regards to the strict treatment of logical remainders (i.e., 
possible configurations that lack empirical support). As 
a result, we can identify four causal configurations that 
make up an enabling use of datafication control (the a’s 
and b’s indicate the similarity of our emerging causal 
configurations through factoring out)2:  
 
Table 1 
Four distinct causal configurations of an enabling 
use of datafication control inside organizations 
OPT * PART * TRAN + (1a)  
VISIB * PART *  ~AUT + (1b)  
AUT * OPT  + (2a) 
 TRUST AUT * TRAN    (2b) 
  
4.1. Across-case interpretation  
 
The first two configurations are summarized as 1a) 
and 1b) because they share the presence of openness for 
employee participation (PART) at a minimum; the same 
holds for the second two, relating to the (higher) 
automation potential of datafication control applications 
(AUT). In the remainder, each causal recipe is described 
as well as evaluated with regards to its quality 
parameters, namely consistency, and coverage (both 
ranging between 0 and 1). Briefly, consistency (which 
mirrors significance in variance-based analyses) relates 
to how well the relationship of causal conditions 
postulated in the configuration for a particular outcome 
fits with the empirical data. Hence, a high consistency 
value indicates that a particular configuration is a well-
suited explanatory model for the outcome of interest. 
Coverage resembles well with the premises of R2 and 
tabular presentation of the results [45]; yet all relevant quality 






indicates empirical relevance, i.e. how many cases 
empirically share a configuration [68]. In the overall 
view, our four causal configurations show a consistency 
of 0.916 indicating a very well-fitting explanatory 
model of our data. Coverage displays 0.392, indicating 
that our overall model covers roughly 30 out of 72 
companies. It is noteworthy, however, that a small-to-
medium size coverage is no “knockout” criterion. In 
contrast, it rather urges researchers to dive into the 
idiosyncrasy of therein contained cases to make an 
overall and meaningful theoretical contribution [47].  
The first causal configuration 
(OPT*PART*TRAN) indicates that the joint 
combination of openness for employee participation, the 
possibility to opt-out from being a target to datafication 
as well as transparency, i.e., employee knowledge on 
what data is gathered, how and why it is analyzed, is 
related positively to trust inside the organization. This 
configuration has perfect consistency (=1) and shows a 
unique coverage of 0.04 (equaling 3 cases). The second 
configuration (VISIB*PART*~AUT) displays that a 
privacy-invasive use of datafication technology can go 
hand in hand with trust, if it is jointly enacted with 
possibilities for employees to participate in the design 
of datafication control and if datafication technology’s 
prescriptive capabilities are absent. Similarly, this 
configuration exhibits perfect consistency (=1) and 
covers approx. 10% (n=7) of the cases. The third and 
fourth configurations (AUT* (OPT+TRAN)) display 
that intelligent datafication technology with prescriptive 
capabilities can coexist with trust in the workplace if 
employees are allowed to opt-out from being a target of 
control or if the employer provides sound information 
on what employee-related data is gathered and why it is 
analyzed. Configuration 2a) has a perfect consistency, 
configuration 2b) has a 0.8 consistency and both 
configurations cover approx. 15% (n=11) of the cases.  
All our results indicate that an organization’s 
efforts to enable employee centricity, that is to make 
sure that datafication controls are psychologically 
integrated via openness for participation or granting opt-
out or transparency, is critical for a trust-enabling use of 
datafication control. At the most basic level, we find the 
three most salient building blocks of employee-
centricity from trust and control literature to mutually 
reinforce each other (1a), also in the context of 
datafication [10, 69]. Furthermore, our results show how 
employee centricity can mitigate obvious trust threats, 
that stem from augmented data gathering and analysis 
capabilities of datafication. Commonly, augmented 
data-gathering capabilities of datafication controls are 
often associated with risks of a trust-impairing 
panopticon [70]. Similarly, datafication controls’ 
automation potential bears risks that managers no longer 
care about employee needs, which likely challenge the 
bases of trust, as well [34]. However, and as 
configuration 1b) indicates, panoptical effects can be 
mitigated, if employee centricity manifests in efforts to 
contextualize the gathered data, as demonstrated via 
PART and ~AUT. By granting employees with 
possibilities to provide further (contextual) information, 
organizations invite employees to contribute to the 
validity of datafication, especially in contexts where 
one’s (performance) contribution is difficult to assess. 
This contextualization effort is further reinforced via a 
conscious forego of prescriptive capabilities in such a 
setting, indicating that leaders should remain as 
important intermediaries in making sense of the 
analyses and should not leave the field alone to 
datafication technology. Configurations 2a) and 2b) 
show that even a far-reaching automation potential, 
which can materialize in a way that datafication controls 
prescribe employees how to behave and react, do not 
necessarily need to reduce trust inside the organization. 
This seems to be alleviated by giving employees some 
type of (felt) control as they can either opt-out or feel 
that they understand what expectations they need to 
meet to navigate safely through their technology-
immersed workplace. By granting employees an opt-out 
option, organizations can demonstrate employee-
centricity such that there is a “red line” of automation 
that must not be crossed. Similarly, organizations’ 
efforts in explaining to employees what data is gathered 
and why it is analyzed can signal a “gift of maturity” 
and, hence, enable employees to participate in the 
organizational technology discourse on eye-level, for 
instance about the promises and limits of datafication.  
 
4.2. Within-case interpretation  
To make sense of our emerging configurations on 
the case level, we went back to our survey data and 
consulted publicly available company information, e.g., 
from media coverage. At a closer inspection on case 
level, configuration 1a) comprises companies that 
operate in highly regulated business sectors, such as 
finance and insurance, and whose business is under 
great public scrutiny and observation, i.e., where the 
public has a legitimate interest in data-sensitive business 
practices. Thus, this enabling datafication control 
configuration coincides with a broadly-based 
stakeholder dialogue on datafication purchase and 
implementation decisions and also involves external 
stakeholders, such as educational institutions and think 
tanks. These actors are known to address rather 
uncomfortable truths for companies with regards to 
technology deployment. Hence, one would not expect 
them as typical sparring partners in the industry; their 
involvement, however, is a token for employee-





approach to trust sensitive use of datafication control, 
1b) companies take a more ethics-sensible approach. 
This manifests in that collective norms of moral 
awareness [71] are rated significantly higher on average 
compared to our overall sample. Sample items read “In 
our company, we are aware of ethical issues related to 
People Management Analytics”, “We recognize a moral 
dilemma related to People Management Analytics right 
away”, or “People are very sensitive to ethical problems 
related to People Management Analytics.” Besides, this 
heightened moral awareness is reflected in a salient 
position and lively interaction with the ombudsman, to 
whom employees can turn if they have concerns 
regarding datafication control.  
Finally, companies from configurations 2a) and 
2b) feature tech vanguardism, including a desire to 
experiment with automation and prescriptive analyses. 
This is reflected in a strong strategic technology 
orientation, as almost exclusively the top management 
team acts as a driving force in purchasing and 
implementation decisions. Besides, the almost exclusive 
involvement of (HR) consulting firms points to 
datafication control as a strategic fashion trend where 
firms want to become or catch up “state of the art”. In 
this realm, employee-centricity, again, is oriented 
towards the duality of safeguard-oriented vs. ethics-
sensible approaches. Whereas opt-out favoring 
companies of 2a) also implement a variety of 
ombudsman-variants, the above-average shared moral 
awareness also makes 2b) companies engage in 
transparency-initiatives, not least because they may 
have realized the difficulty of offering a “real” opt-out 
option in a dependent employment relationship.  
 
5. Contribution and discussion  
Our results contribute to the still heated scientific 
debate on the duality of trust and control in a digital age 
as we can identify trust-enabling forms of datafication 
control [10, 12, p. 538]. First, our results indicate that 
datafication control can promote trust inside 
organizations. Thus, similar to “traditional control”, 
enabling datafication control configurations can be 
distinguished from coercive ones [43]. Particularly 
concerning 1a) and 1b) configurations, our findings also 
show that datafication control is not necessarily the 
“new coercive” of the digital age, as some scholars 
argue [see 37]. Furthermore, our four trust-enabling 
datafication control configurations highlight that an 
organization’s active stance for employee centricity in 
datafication control matters for a trust-enabling 
enactment. The identified levers of employee-centricity 
can ensure employee self-determination, learning, and 
leeway for adaption in the context of datafication 
control, hence make them no longer convey solely 
coercive, but, as a result, trust-enabling information 
[10]. Thus, we contribute insights on what can be done 
to make datafication control “a holistically appealing 
experience to workers” as Cardinal and colleagues [12] 
lament to be missing. Secondly, our study contributes to 
the scarcity of configurational methods in studying 
(datafication) control and trust relationships. Echoing 
Misangyi and colleagues [29], there is much theorizing 
about control and trust configurations, but seldom 
empirical testing; if at all, with moderation analyses. 
However, such variance-based analyses fall short of 
proofing the theoretical claims of non-linearity, 
asymmetry, and idiosyncrasy, that make the control-
trust relationship an agentic, dynamic, and idiosyncratic 
accomplishment. Thus, our results highlight that there is 
no silver bullet of enabling datafication control but that 
variants of designing employee-centricity can be 
effective or ineffective in promoting trust, highly 
dependent on the technology design and the embedding 
context [30, 72]. Practitioners might use our results as a 
tentative start to either assess their datafication control 
system’s trust implications or to actively engage in a 
discourse on how to design such a system. For instance, 
practitioners might use 1b) as a guiding principle if 
third-party authorities require fine-grained data analyses 
or 2a) and 2b) if opt-out is legally not feasible.   
 
6. Limitations  
 
Of course, our study is not without limitations. We 
outline them as avenues for further research. First, 
future studies should employ trust measures, that focus 
on specific trust relationships, i.e. differentiate trust 
between peers, trust between employees and leaders, 
and employee trust in their employer by measuring them 
separately (and from the trustors’ perceptive). Building 
on the insights of Long and Sitkin [10] for traditional 
organizational control, we assume that these various 
relationships are impacted by datafication controls in 
many, even unforeseen ways. For instance, we can 
imagine that trust in the leader can get strained strongly 
particularly if prescriptive analytics is used [35]. 
Additionally, we propose that further research should 
use different samples from different countries to 
contribute to the robustness and generalizability of our 
results, which are, of course, limited. For instance, 
future studies could compare countries that differ with 
regards to technology governance mechanisms, legal 
frameworks, or the populations’ general attitude 
towards technology. Finally, our csQCA application is 
an explorative, structure discovery method. Future 
studies can build on the growing cumulative knowledge 
on enabling vs. coercive archetypes of datafication 
control to delineate hypotheses suitable to be tested with 





methods. In all, our results not only contribute to the 
ongoing debate on how controls and trust relate in 21st-
century organizations but also might guide leaders in 
designing datafication control systems that do not have 
a Taylorism coating but a human spark. Eventually, only 
those companies will probably come out on top who 
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